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ABRIDGED TOO FAR: ANTICIPATORY SEARCH
WARRANTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
"An American has no sense of privacy He does not know what
it means. There is no such thing in the country"
George Bernard Shawl
"A rule protective of law-abiding citizens is not apt to flourish
where its advocates are usually criminals."
Justice William 0. Douglas 2
During the past decade, few issues in American society gen-
erated more public debate or raised more concerns than child
abuse, drug use, and pornography Horrifying instances of child
abuse made national headlines.3 The Attorney General of the
United States headed a commission that spent many months
cataloguing the evils of pornography 4 The President of the United
1. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 681 (15th ed. 1980) (from a speech in New York
on Apr. 11, 1933).
2. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled,
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
3. In New York, Joel Steinberg, a disbarred lawyer, was convicted of first-degree
manslaughter in the death of his illegally adopted six-year-old daughter, Lisa. Wash. Post,
Feb. 2, 1989, at A24, col. 1. "The child had been severely beaten over a long period
of time and was killed by a massive blow to her head. Mr. Steinberg and his companion
waited 12 hours before calling for help. By the time an ambulance arrived, Lisa was
no longer breathing." Id.
In Wisconsin, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney fell into a life-threatening coma after a
severe beating by his father in March 1984. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't
of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989). Emergency brain surgery disclosed bleeding
caused by traumatic head injuries inflicted over a period of time; the child suffered brain
damage so extensive that he probably will spend the remainder of his life in an institution
for the profoundly retarded. Id. The Supreme Court refused to hold the State of Wisconsin
liable for Joshua's injuries, even though state social workers "stood by and did nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role." Id. at 203. Wisconsin tried
and convicted Joshua's father of child abuse. Id. at 193.
In California, the trial of former McMartin Preschool teachers Raymond Buckey and
his mother, Peggy McMartin Buckey, ended with 52 not-guilty verdicts. Wash. Post, Jan.
19, 1990, at Al. The jury deadlocked on 13 other charges; Superior Court Judge William
Pounders declared a mistrial on 12 sexual abuse counts against Raymond Buckey and
dismissed a conspiracy charge against Peggy McMartin Buckey. Id. at col. 1 - col. 2. The
trial took nearly three years to prosecute and cost almost $15,000,000, td. at A6, col. 3;
the case "poisoned everyone who had contact with it." Id. at Al, col. 1.
4. L.A. Times, July 10, 1986, at 1, col. 5 (citing 1986 ATT'y GEN. COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY
REP. (the "Meese Commission Report")).
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States continued to lead the "war on drugs" in the face of
widespread use and soaring murder rates.5
In response to these concerns, law enforcement officials have
increased their efforts to combat crime.6 The Supreme Court has
facilitated these efforts by relaxing certain fourth amendment
protections.7 As a result, American jails are literally overflowing
with criminals who are being apprehended in greater numbers
and sentenced to stiffer terms.8
The Court, however, has not addressed the anticipatory search
warrant. An anticipatory, or prospective, search warrant is based
not upon the probability that evidence of a crime is presently
located at the place to be searched, but upon the probability that
someone will likely deliver to or deposit such evidence on those
5. President Nixon launched the federal war on drugs in 1969, "combin[ing] a crackdown
on drug traffickers with an expansion of facilities for treating addicts, and also closer
international cooperation against smugglers." Return of the Hard-Drug Menace, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., June 30, 1975, at 29. By 1975, although the federal government spent $3
billion on drug enforcement, treatment, and prevention programs, the federal effort to
stamp out drugs and drug traffic was described as "a failure in almost every respect."
Id. Yet, the federal effort continues. President Bush's 1991 proposed budget allocated
$10.6 billion to combat drugs. Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1990, at A8, col. 1. The program
targeted $7.6 billion for law enforcement, $1.7 billion for drug treatment, and $1.4 billion
for drug prevention and education. Id.
6. From 1978 to 1987, annual drug arrests increased 54 percent. In 1986 alone
[drug arrests] went up 12.6 percent; the police agencies that cover about 188
million Americans charged 777,285 suspects with drug violations. Drug con-
victions now account for at least one-third of the massive increase in state
prison populations.
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 7, 1989, at S17, col. 2.
7. Notable examples of relaxed fourth amendment standards include: National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (extending the "special needs"
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements to include suspicionless drug
testing of employees); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-33
(1989) (same); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) (adopting "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (adopting a
"totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause). See also Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (finding no fourth amendment search when police observed drugs
through open roof of greenhouse while flying over it in helicopter); California v. Green-
wood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-43 (1988) (finding no fourth amendment expectation of privacy in
bags of garbage left on street for trash collector).
8. Federal and state prison populations have almost doubled over the last decade and
currently stand at 673,565. See Joel, Time to Deal with Ameria's Prison Crsis, HERITAGE
FOUND. REP., Nov. 15, 1989 (quoting Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Prison Population Jumps 7.3 Percent in Six Months, Press Release, Sept. 10, 1989). The
overcrowding may worsen in the future: "The U.S. Sentencing Commission estimates that
the federal prison population will rise from 42,000 in 1987 to 92,000 in 1997." Id. at n.7
(quoting Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Our Crowded Jails: A National
Plight, June 1988). The Rand Corporation estimates that large state prison populations
alone will increase 25 to 98% in the next eight years. Id. (quoting Clear, Research sn
Correctwns, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS AND ROBERT J. KUTAK FOUND., Mar. 1988).
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premises at some future time.9 Police use anticipatory search
warrants when they have information indicating an imminent
drug delivery at a specific location 0 or when they discover drugs
or child pornography in a package traveling through the United
States mail." The vast majority of state and federal courts that
have addressed the constitutionality of anticipatory search war-
rants have found them constitutional.12 A few courts, however,
have found anticipatory search warrants unconstitutional,'3 and
others have stated concerns about the potential for abuse of
these warrants. 4
This Note reconsiders the policies and procedures surrounding
anticipatory search warrants in light of the general trend of
fourth amendment jurisprudence. First, after a brief overview of
fourth amendment protections, the Note examines the philosoph-
ical underpinnings of the fourth amendment and the general
retreat from those early principles in recent Supreme Court
decisions. Second, it reviews the factual situations that create
the need for anticipatory search warrants by examining three
cases, particularly emphasizing the rationale in support of or in
9. See 2 W LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 94
(2d ed. 1987) (information as to prospective events).
10. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 110 S. Ct. 348
(1989); State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); State v. Wright, 115 Idaho
1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); Commonwealth v. Reviera, 387 Pa. Super. 196,
563 A.2d 1252 (1989).
11. See United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dented, 490 U.S.
1005 (1989); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hale,
784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); United States v. Lowe, 575 P.2d
1193 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 869 (1978); United States v. Outland, 476 F.2d 581
(6th Cir. 1973); United States ez rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Zygarowslu, 724 F Supp. 1052 (D. Mass. 1989); United States v. Flippen, 674
F Supp. 536 (E.D. Va. 1987), affd mem., 861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Feldman, 366 F Supp. 356 (D. Haw. 1973).
12. See Garcm, 882 F.2d 699; Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195; Goodunn, 854 F.2d 33; Hale,
784 F.2d 1465; Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193; Outland, 476 F.2d 581; Skaff, 418 F.2d 430; Zygarowski,
724 F Supp. 1052; Feldman, 366 F Supp. 356; Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska
1980); Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166; State v. Cox, 110 Ariz. 603, 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Mehrens v.
State, 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984);
Berme v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988); W-nght, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250;
Commonwealth v. Soares, 384 Mass. 149, 424 N.E.2d 221 (1981); State v. Mier, 147 N.J.
Super. 17, 370 A.2d 515 (1977); People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 282 N.E.2d 614, 331 N.Y.S.2d
656 (1972); Renera, 387 Pa. Super. 196, 563 A.2d 1252; State v. Coker, 746 S.W.2d 167
(Tenn. 1987), cert. dented. 488 U.S. 871 (1988); State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985).
13. See United States ex rel. Campbell v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964); Flippen,
674 F Supp. 536; United States v. Roberts, 333 F Supp. 786 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); State v.
Guthrie, 90 Me. 448, 38 A. 368 (1897).
14. See Garcm, 882 F.2d 699; Wrght, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250; snfra notes 114-51,
170-202 and accompanying text.
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opposition to such warrants. Third, the Note focuses on the
constitutionality and the propriety of anticipatory search war-
rants.
Finally, this Note proposes a solution to the problem, acknowl-
edging the limited utility of anticipatory search warrants while
offering specific guidance for avoiding the inherent dangers that
accompany such warrants. A recent federal district court decision
addressing an anticipatory search warrant tests the utility of
this resolution and highlights its potential impact on future
cases.15 The Note concludes that, in an era in which hysteria and
moral indignation about drug use, child abuse, and pornography
provide the impetus for judicial decisions that threaten to break
down the most sacred barriers between the state and the mdi-
vidual, the Court should return to the bedrock values underlying
the fourth amendment. Rather than blindly facilitating police
efforts to combat crime, the Court should reaffirm the basic right
to privacy in one's own home by strictly limiting the scope and
use of anticipatory search warrants. 6
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: CELEBRATED ASCENT,
INDELICATE DECLINE
The fourth amendment 7 protects individual privacy and pos-
sessory rights 8 by prohibiting unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.19 A search is subject to the amendment's warrant
requirements when police inspection intrudes upon a legitimate
expectation of privacy.20 A neutral and detached magistrate must
issue a warrant,2' whether to arrest or to search, and he may
15. United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); see tnfira notes 271-323
and accompanying text.
16. Although anticipatory search warrants are not per se unconstitutional, they present
a great potential for abuse if not carefully monitored by the judiciary. The Supreme
Court should provide police, magistrates, and judges with clear guidance on how to craft
such a warrant within the bounds of the fourth amendment.
17. The fourth amendment to the Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
18. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; cases cited supra note 13.
20. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
21. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("[ljnferences [must] be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.").
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not issue it without probable cause and a particular description
of the place to be searched and the things to be seized.2i Courts
usually exclude evidence that law enforcement officials obtained
pursuant to a search warrant that was not based on probable
cause or was otherwise defective.ai
Orgzn of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment to the Constitution arose out of the
furor over the writs of assistance that customs officers used to
detect smuggled goods in the American colonies.24 These writs
of assistance were general search warrants2 5 that authorized a
civil officer and his deputies to "search any house, shop, [or]
warehouse, . break open doors, chests, [or] packages, in case
of resistance; and remove any prohibited . . . goods or merchan-
dise."26 This grant of nearly absolute and unlimited discretion
enabled officials to search, at their will, wherever they suspected
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV
23. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-
94 (1914), overru/ed, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). In Mapp, the Court held
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures m violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions
of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not
to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
The good faith exception that the Court adopted in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984), severely curtailed the exclusionary rule. In Leon, the Court concluded:
[S]uppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered
only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion
will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. [The exclusionary
rule] cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively
reasonable law enforcement activity. We conclude that the marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objec-
tively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant
cannot justify the "ubstantial costs of exclusion.
I& at 918-22; see tnfra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
24. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51 (1970).
25. Writs of assistance became effective in England after an act of Charles H in 1662.
Id. at 53. An act of William I in 1696 made the writs applicable to the American
colonies. I&
26. Id-
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smuggled or prohibited goods "and to break open any receptacle
or package falling under their suspecting eye[s]."
Early leaders of the American independence movement rec-
ognized the evil of these writs of assistance.2 James Otis, Jr., a
Boston lawyer, called the writs "the worst instance of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty, that ever was
found in an English law book." John Adams was a spectator at
the court hearing at which Otis "completely electrified the large
audience in the court room with his denunciation of England's
whole policy toward the Colonies and with his argument against
general warrants."30 Adams assessed the impact of Otis' speech
in glowing terms: "I do say in the most solemn manner, that Mr
Otis's [sic] oration against the Writs of Assistance breathed into
this nation the breath of life."3' 1 In Adams' eyes,
[Otis] was a flame of fire! Every man of a crowded audience
appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms
against Writs of Assistance. Then and there was the first
scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years,
namely in 1776, he grew to manhood, and declared himself
free.32
The first American precedent for the fourth amendment was
clause X of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, which the Wil-
liamsburg Convention adopted on June 12, 1776.- The clause
provided
[t]hat general warrants whereby an officer or messenger may
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of
a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named,
or whose offense is not particularly described and supported
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be
granted,
Inclusion in the Virginia Bill of Rights assured that a search and
seizure provision would appear in every state declaration or bill
of rights.35 The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780,
27. Id. at 54.
28. Id. at 58-60.
29. Id. at 59.
30. Id. at 58.
31. Id. at 59 (quoting 10 C. ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 276 (1856)).
32. Id. (quoting 10 C. ADAMS, supra note 31, at 247-48).
33. Id. at 79.
34. Id. at 79 n.3 (quoting 2 B. PooRE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1909 (1877)).
35. Id. at 80.
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using "more elaborate wording" than Virginia, was the first state
declaration to use the expression "unreasonable searches and
seizures."3 6
The drive to include a bill of rights in the Constitution led to
the eventual adoption of the current fourth amendment.3 7 Inspired
by forceful leadership from Virginia's Patrick Henry, anti-Fed-
eralists maintained that a strong central government could not
be trusted to protect individual liberty without adopting certain
expressly reserved rights into the Constitution.3 8 Henry ap-
plauded the Virginia Constitution for having, "with the most
cautious and enlightened circumspection, guarded those indefea-
sible rights which ought ever to be held sacred!"39 In particular,
Henry warned that federal sheriffs acting under authority of
general warrants would pose a great danger-
When these harpies are aided by excisemen, who may search,
at any time, your houses and most secret recesses, will the
people bear it? If you think so, you differ from me The
officers of Congress may come upon you now, fortified with
all the terrors of paramount federal authority Excisemen may
come in multitudes; for the limitation of their numbers no man
knows. They may, unless the general government be restrained
by a bill of rights, or some similar restriction, go into your
cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure everything
you eat, drink, or wear. They ought to be restrained within
proper bounds.4
Henry also decried the lack of concern for individual rights:
I feel myself distressed, because the necessity of securing our
personal rghts seems not to have pervaded the minds of men;
36. Id. at 82. Article 14 read:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not
accompanied with a special designation of the person or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued, but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.
Id. (quoting 1 B. POORE, supra note 34, at 959).
37. Id. at 83.
38. Id. at 92-93.
39. Id. at 93 (quoting 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445-49 (J. Elliot ed.
1836) [hereinafter DEBATES]).
40. Id. at 92-93 (quoting 3 DEBATES, supra note 39, at 58, 445-49).
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for many valuable things are omitted [from the proposed
Constitution]:- for instance, general warrants, by which an
officer may search suspected places, without evidence of the
commission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence of
his crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are admitted, any
man may be seized, any property may be taken in the most
arbitrary manner without any evidence or reason. Everything
the most secret may be searched and ransacked by the strong
arm of power.41
Henry's sentiment prevailed; both houses of Congress formally
enacted the fourth amendment, which the states subsequently
ratified.42
Development of Fourth Amendment Law n the Supreme Court
Reasonableness
Boyd v. United States 3 was one of the earliest cases concerning
an unreasonable search and seizure. In Boyd, the defendant
allegedly defrauded customs officials of import duties on a glass
shipment.44 Taking advantage of customs revenue law, the district
attorney secured an order requiring the defendant to produce an
invoice on a previous shipment of glass.45 The Supreme Court
held that the compulsory production of a man's private papers
in order to establish a criminal charge against him or to require
forfeiture of his property was an unreasonable search and seizure
under the fourth amendment.46 The Court declared:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet it
contains their substance and essence, and effects their sub-
stantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in
its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and un-
constitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to
the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person
41. Id. at 94 (quoting 3 DEBATES, supra note 39, at 588).
42. Id. at 102-03.
43. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
44. Id. at 617-18.
45. Id. at 618.
46. Id. at 634-35.
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and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.47
This individual rights sentiment continued to pervade the
Court's opinions after the turn of the century 48 Yet, as Justice
Butler acknowledged in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,4 9
"There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.
Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. 50
In the late 1960's, the Warren Court established the cardinal
constitutional rule on reasonableness in Katz v. United States5 1"
warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment -subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions. ' 52 Over the years, the Court outlined
several exceptions as they became necessary- exigent circum-
stances,53 searches incident to a valid arrest,54 consent searches, 55
inventory searches,56 searches of vehicles,5 7 searches of vessels
on the high seas,s border searches,5 9 and searches in which
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
47. Id. at 635.
48. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), provided a good example of how the Boyd
philosophy carried through to the Court's opinions in later years. In Ker, the Court
stated:
Implicit in the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures is its recognition of individual freedom. That safeguard has
been declared to be "as of the very essence of constitutional liberty" the
guaranty of which "is as important and as imperative as are the guaranties
of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen.
Id. at 32-33 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)). The Court continued
in the same vein: "While the language of the Amendment is 'general,' it 'forbids every
search that is unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or known to be offenders as
well as the innocent, and unquestionably extends to the premises where the search was
made '" Id. (quoting Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931)).
49. 282 U.S. 344.
50. Id. at 357.
51. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
52. Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
53. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
54. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979).
55. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973).
56. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976).
57. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
58. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983).
59. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
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make the warrant and probable-cause requirements impractica-
ble."60 For each exception, after balancing the need for effective
law enforcement against the individual's privacy right,61 the Court
determined that a warrant, probable cause, or both may be absent
in making a search. Each new exception represented an incre-
mental reduction in fourth amendment protection.
Several of the exceptions arose from drug interdiction and
enforcement.6 2 The Court's recent extension of the "special needs"
exception to employee drug testing is particularly disturbing. In
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executsves' Assocsatwn 3 and Natwnal
Treasury Employees Unon v. Von Raab,64 the Court held that
random, suspicionless drug tests (breath, blood, and urine) do not
constitute unreasonable searches and seizures. 65 Dispensing with
both the warrant and probable cause requirements, the Court in
Sk'nner held that "[i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would
be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspi-
cion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of [any]
such suspicion '." 66
This extension of the special needs exception is especially
troubling in Von Raab, in which statistics failed to reveal a
widespread problem,67 thus proving that the justification for
testing was almost entirely speculative .6 As Justice Scalia noted,
the Court's holding was merely a symbolic response to the drug
60. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
61. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
62. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 532-36 (customs officers at Los Angeles
airport detained suspect because she fit the profile of an "alimentary canal smuggler"
frequent trips to Miami or Los Angeles, inability to speak English, lack of friends or
family in the United States, and arrival from Bogota, Colombia, a "source city" for
narcotics; after over 24 hours of detention, suspect began to defecate balloons filled with
cocaine, eventually passing nearly 90 such balloons); Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 582-
84 (customs officers boarded a sailboat in Louisiana ship channel ostensibly to check the
vessel's documentation and discovered 5,800 pounds of marijuana; according to the
defendant, they were acting on an informant's tip); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 3-5 (1977) (suspect matched profile used to spot drug traffickers; police conducted
warrantless search of footlocker and discovered large amount of marijuana).
63. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
64. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
65. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 678-79; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
66. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
67. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 681-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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scourge with no regard for privacy rights. 69 The Court's treat-
ment of the warrant and probable cause requirements was hardly
sacred, appearing more like one of the "stealthy encroachments"
warned of in Boyd.70
Probable Cause
Over the years, the Supreme Court evolved the concept of
probable cause. In 1813, Chief Justice Marshall stated only that
probable cause "means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation."7' 1 In 1925, in Carroll v. United States,7 2 the Court
adopted an equally concise definition, stating that "the substance
of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground
for belief in guilt."7 3 In 1949, the Court elaborated on these
earlier attempts to pin down the notion of probable cause in
Brnegar v. Unsted States7 4"
In dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. Since Marshall's time, [probable cause] has come
to mean more than bare suspicion: [it] exists where "the
facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.7 5
69. Id. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia delivered a scathing attack on the Von
Raab majority. The following passage captures the essence of his dissent:
Today, in Skinner, we allow a less intrusive bodily search of railroad em-
ployees involved in train accidents. I joined the Court's opinion there because
the demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class
of employees, and the demonstrated connection between such use and grave
harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of protecting society. I decline
to join the Court's opinion in [Von Raab] because neither frequency of use
nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my view the
Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity
in symbolic opposition to drug use.
Id. at 680-S1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
71. See Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813).
72. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
73. Id. at 161 (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)).
74. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
75. Id. at 175-76 (footnote omitted) (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162).
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Two cases in the 1960's, Aguilar v. Texas 6 and Spinell v.
Unsted States," defined more sharply the nature of a proper
probable cause inquiry The Aguilar-Spbnells framework was a
two-part test meant to guide a magistrate in judging the relia-
bility of an informant's hearsay affidavit.7 8 This test had a verac-
ity prong, covering the credibility of the informant and the
reliability of his information, and a basis of knowledge prong,
requiring that "underlying circumstances" be set forth to verify
the informant's conclusion. 79
The Aguilar-Spnell$ rules stood for fourteen years, until the
Court expressly abandoned them in I1lhnos v. Gates.0 In Gates,
the majority of the Court, led by Justice Rehnquist, reversed an
Illinois Supreme Court decision that suppressed certain evidence
on the basis of the Aguilar-Spsnelh. two-pronged test.8' Rehnquist
noted that "probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."8 2
Instead, a "totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more
consistent with [the Court's] prior treatment of probable cause
than is any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every
informant's tip."''
Rehnquist's rationale was, in part, that affidavits should not
be subject to technical requirements because nonlawyers nor-
mally draft affidavits "'in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation.' "84 Moreover, many persons who issue search and
arrest warrants are neither lawyers nor judges; these laymen
also should be free from technical requirements.85 Finally, Rehn-
quist worried that police would resort to warrantless searches
and, rather than face the scrutiny of the Aguilar-Spsnells test,
attempt to establish consent or some other exception to the
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search.6
Inevitably, "[t]he strictures that accompany the 'two-pronged
76. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
77. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
78. Id. at 412-18.
79. Id. at 413.
80. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
81. Id. at 227-30.
82. Id. at 232.
83. Id. at 230-31 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 235 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 236.
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test' cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforce-
ment."8
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, adopted a decidedly different
view than did Rehnquist. Brennan's arguments, defending the
Aguilar-Spsnells standards, are the better views, largely because
they more closely reflect Patrick Henry's and James Otis' oppo-
sition to the writs of assistance.88 They are certainly truer to the
philosophy of Boyd.89
Brennan conceded that the Aguilar-Sptnelhl framework "re-
quire[d] the police to provide magistrates with certain crucial
information." 90 This structured inquiry, however,
preserve[d] the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of
probable cause, insure[d] greater accuracy in probable-cause
determinations, and advance[d] the substantive value of pre-
cluding findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions,
based on anything less than information from an honest or
credible person who has acquired his information in a reliable
way 91
Brennan acknowledged that "[e]veryone shares the Court's con-
cern over the horrors of drug trafficking," but adhered to the
thought that "under our Constitution only measures consistent
with the Fourth Amendment may be employed by government
to cure this evil. '92 As Brennan wisely pointed out,
We must be ever mindful of Justice Stewart's admonition in
Coolidge v. New Hampshtre: "In times of unrest, whether caused
by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion,
[the fourth amendment] and the values that it represents may
appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values
were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional
concepts. 93
Gates exemplified the Court's continual backsliding in the area
of fourth amendment protections. Concern for effective law en-
forcement against drug use and trafficking, the latest crisis of
87. Id. at 237.
88. See supra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
90. Gates, 462 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (citation omitted)).
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epic proportions, was the impetus for a degradation of every
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy Here again, the
specter of Boyd's "stealthy encroachments" 94 cast a shadow over
individual rights.
The Excluswnary Rule
Like reasonableness and probable cause, the exclusionary rule
has developed over the course of many years. Initially, in Weeks
v. Unsted States,95 the Supreme Court excluded evidence in federal
cases only if an illegal search and seizure produced such evi-
dence.9 6 In Wolf v. Colorado,97 the Court had the opportunity to
extend the exclusionary rule to the states and seemed ready to
do so:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-
is basic to a free society It is implicit in the "concept of
ordered liberty" The knock at the door, whether by day
or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law
but solely on the authority of the police, [can] be con-
demned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents
of English-speaking peoples.9 8
Despite this rather forceful commentary on the importance of
fourth amendment protections, the Court refused to sanction any
extension of the exclusionary rule in Wolf.99
94. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
95. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
96. Id. at 398. In Weeks, the Court stated in no uncertain terms:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and might as well be stricken from the Consti-
tution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice
of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unau-
thorized action.
Id. at 393-94.
97. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
98. Id. at 27-28.
99. Id. at 33. The Court in Wolf noted that the Weeks doctrine of excluding illegally
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Not until 1961 in Mapp v. Ohw"01 did the Court extend the
exclusionary rule to the states.101 As Justice Clark noted in his
majority opinion, the fourth amendment, in conjunction with the
fifth amendment, perpetuates "'principles of humanity and civil
liberty.' "102 These two amendments express "'supplementing
phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate
large areas of personal privacy' "103 Without the exclusionary
rule, "[tihe ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State
tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on
which the liberties of the people rest."'10 4
The exclusionary rule stood undisturbed for twenty-three years,
applicable to both state and federal governments. In 1984, how-
ever, the Court adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule in United States v. Leon.10 5 Justice White's rationale in
adopting this good faith exception was that the exclusionary rule
served no deterrent function when police, acting with objective
good faith, obtained a search warrant from a magistrate and
acted within the warrant's scope.10 6 Furthermore, according to
White, strict application of the exclusionary rule carried too many
costs: the exclusion of evidence impeded the truthfinding function
of judge and jury, resulting in the acquittal of guilty defendants
or the imposition of reduced sentences,'0 7 which in turn led to
"'disrespect for the law and the administration of justice.' ''108
Once again, Justice Brennan's dissent was truer to the values
underlying the fourth amendment:
It is difficult to give any meaning at all to the limitations
imposed by the [Fourth] Amendment if they are read to pro-
scribe only certain conduct by the police but to allow other
obtained evidence in federal prosecutions was neither "derived from the explicit require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment" nor "based on legislation expressing Congressional
policy in the enforcement of the Constitution." Id. at 28. Moreover, 31 states rejected
this doctrine subsequent to the decision in Weeks. Id. at 29. Finally, the Court pointed
out more appropriate and effective remedies than the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence: actions for damages by aggrieved private citizens, internal discipline among
police, and public opinion. Id. at 31.
100. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
101. Id. at 655.
102. Id. at 657 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897))
103. Id. (quoting Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944)).
104. Id. at 660.
105. 468 U.S. 897, 922-24 (1984).
106. Id. at 919-20.
107. Id. at 907.
108. Id. at 908 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)).
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agents of the same government to take advantage of evidence
secured by the police in violation of its requirements. The
[Fourth] Amendment therefore must be read to condemn not
only the initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy-which is
done, after all, for the purpose of securing evidence-but also
the subsequent use of any evidence so obtained. 109
Brennan's dissenting opinion reflected the concerns for judicial
integrity and the right to privacy that Clark expressed so elo-
quently in Mapp: "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence."110 Clark continued, quoting
Justice Brandeis: "'Our Government is the potent, the omnipres-
ent teacher For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by
its example If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy' ,"
The development of fourth amendment law, from the 1700's to
the present, began with a religious fervor for the protection of
individual rights and privacy and ended with a decade-long re-
treat from those early principles. Numerous exceptions, purport-
edly narrowly drawn, have nearly extinguished the notion that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. The amorphous,
relaxed standard now used to determine probable cause offers
magistrates little guidance as to what information is crucial to
such a finding. Finally, the good faith exception has extracted
the teeth of the exclusionary rule. In each case, the Supreme
Court has turned its back on fundamental concepts that the
Framers of the Constitution deemed sacred. Against such a
backdrop, this Note examines the constitutionality and propriety
of anticipatory search warrants.
ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS: FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Various factual situations have given rise to anticipatory search
warrants. Although authorities most commonly seek anticipatory
search warrants in drug and child pornography cases, officers
have also sought such warrants to obtain incriminating documents
109. Id. at 933-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
110. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
111. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)).
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from a lawyer1 12 and to obtain surgical instruments and other
articles necessary to perform abortions.113 The following United
States courts of appeals cases illustrate the typical situations
involving drugs or child pornography.
Federal Court
United States v. Garcsa;14
Several defendants in Unsted States v. Garma operated a co-
caine smuggling ring between the United States and Panama.
115
112. See Mehrens v. State, 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), cert. dented,
469 U.S. 870 (1984). Attorney Craig Mehrens represented Ronald Wayman on charges of
molesting his minor daughter. Id. at 459, 675 P.2d at 719. During their investigation of
Wayman, the police learned that he had written and sent letters to his daughter allegedly
containing incriminating statements and that these letters were in Mehrens' possession.
Id.
The trial court took possession of the letters during a debate over their discovery and
eventually ordered Mehrens to reclaim them. Id. at 460, 675 P.2d at 720. The State
obtained an anticipatory search warrant that directed the police to search Mehrens when
he came to the courthouse. Id. As Mehrens left the court's chambers, the police served
the warrant on him; when Mehrens refused to comply voluntarily, the police seized his
briefcase containing the letters. Id.
Mehrens filed a "contravention of search warrant" action to have the letters returned,
but the trial court denied this petition. Id. Mehrens then appealed to the Arizona Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id. at 463, 675 P.2d at 723.
113. See United States ex rel. Campbell v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964). In
Rundle, a Pennsylvama state policeman received information that equipment necessary
to perform abortions was located at a building owned by the defendant, Charles Campbell.
Id. at 155. Because the use of such equipment to procure miscarriages was a felony at
the time, a magistrate issued an anticipatory search warrant based upon the allegations
of possession of these abortion instruments. Id. at 154-55.
The police executed the warrant later in the evening on the date of issuance. Id.
Among the items seized were surgical instruments, drugs, hypodermic needles, surgical
bandages, and an examining chair. Id. at 155-56. The police also seized the clothes Campbell
was wearing (white cap, surgeon's mask, white coat, rubber gloves, and white trousers),
as well as a large quantity of cash which Campbell was carrying. Id. at 156.
Campbell was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. Id. Following the Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Campbell petitioned the court for a writ
of habeas corpus, attacking the anticipatory search warrant on the grounds that the
police had not shown probable cause. Rundle, 327 F.2d at 156. The Third Circuit concluded
that the search warrant was invalid, as the affidavit supporting it contained mere
speculation that the defendant might violate the law in the future. Id. at 162. The court
held that a search warrant must be "based upon a judicial determination of the present
existence of pstifysng grounds--.e., at the time of the issuance of the warrant." Id. at
163.
Rundle was one of the earliest decisions on the issue of anticipatory warrants and
relates in some fashion to the discussion of timeliness. See infra notes 203-18 and
accompanying text. Because the facts are so bizarre, however, the case offers little help
in deciding the issue.
114. 882 F.2d 699 (2dCir.), cert. denzed, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989).
115. Id. at 700.
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In February 1988, two servicemen, Darryl Hooks and Kendell
Oliver, arrived in Miami from Panama carrying thirty-three kil-
ograms of cocaine.116 Customs officers noticed that the two men
appeared nervous and decided to search them after reading
Oliver's name on a "customs alert list."117 The search revealed
the cocaine."8
Hooks and Oliver later met with Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) agents and agreed to cooperate with the govern-
ment in a controlled delivery of the cocaine to one of the
defendants, Celina Wilson-Grant. 119 At this point, the DEA agents
applied for and received an anticipatory search warrant to search
the apartment designated by Wilson-Grant 120 for cocaine, cur-
rency, drug records, and narcotics paraphernalia. 121 Execution of
the warrant was contingent upon delivery of the drugs by Hooks
and Oliver 122
Shortly after Hooks and Oliver entered the apartment, but
before Wilson-Grant actually took possession of the cocaine, DEA
agents entered the premises, announced that they had a warrant,
and began to search the apartment. I2 Wilson-Grant was arrested
on drug-trafficking charges 124 and subsequently sought to sup-
press the evidence recovered in the search on the grounds that
the search warrant was invalid.125
Wilson-Grant challenged the anticipatory search warrant on
two theories. First, she alleged, the warrant in this case was
invalid, and anticipatory search warrants in general were per se
unconstitutional, because the DEA agents did not have probable
cause to believe contraband was located in the apartment when
the court issued the warrant.12 6 Second, she argued, the contin-
116. Id. Drug traffickers used military servicemen stationed in Panama as couriers to
transport the cocaine into the United States; the servicemen, on leave or traveling to
the United States on government business, would obtain the cocaine from Panamanian




119. Id. at 701.
120. Hooks and Oliver phoned Wilson-Grant and, after explaining their delay to her






125. Id. at 701-02.
126. Id. at 702.
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gency governing the execution of the warrant-delivery of the
cocaine-had not yet occurred when the DEA agents entered the
premises. 127
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected both arguments.1 Addressing the constitutionality of
the search warrant, the court acknowledged that an anticipatory
search warrant is, by definition, a warrant issued before the
occurrence of events necessary for a constitutional search of the
premises. 12 The court made it clear that if the specified events
did not transpire, the warrant was void.130 In the court's opinion,
probable cause supported anticipatory warrants only when a
government official produced independent evidence that delivery
of contraband would or was likely to occur and the warrant was
conditioned upon that delivery '3' The court found immaterial the
fact that the contraband was not presently located at the place
described in the warrant, so long as probable cause existed that
it would be present upon execution of the search warrant.
13 2
The Second Circuit found Professor LaFave's reasoning partic-
ularly persuasive on the issue of constitutionality3 LaFave
argued in his treatise,
[A]s a general proposition the facts put forward to justify
issuance of an anticipatory warrant are more likely to establish
that probable cause will exist at the time of the search than
the typical warrant based solely upon the known prior location
of the items to be seized at the place to be searched.13
LaFave adopted the reasoning of People v. Glen, 35 a 1972 New
York case:
At best, present possession is only probative of the likelihood
of future possession. In cases [involving anticipatory warrants,]
the certainty of future possession is greater or is often greater
than that based on information of past and presumably current
127. Id.
128. Id. at 702-05.
129. Id. at 702.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969)).
132. Id. (citing United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dened,
490 U.S. 1005 (1989); United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. denwd, 439
U.S. 869 (1978)).
133. Id.
134. 2 W LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 97.
135. 30 N.Y.2d 252, 282 N.E.2d 614, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, cert. dened, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
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possession. [I]n many kinds of organized crime the evi-
dence supplied to obtain warrants does not relate to current
crimes but past crimes with circumstances showing the likeli-
hood of continuance of the same activity In the present cases
the evidence that there would be a consummated prospective
crime was logically and probatively stronger. The necessary
pieces were in motion and all but inevitably the pieces would
fall into a set, at a later time, constituting the crime. 136
For the court in Garcea, the most important policy considera-
tions were encouraging law enforcement officials to obtain judicial
approval before searching private premises and discouraging
police from proceeding without a warrant rather than risking a
loss of both criminal and contraband.137 According to the Second
Circuit, allowing a police officer to obtain a warrant in advance
of the delivery of contraband, rather than forcing him to go to
the scene without a warrant, would better serve the objectives
of the fourth amendment. 138 The court stated that a police officer
proceeding without a warrant is constrained not only by the
narrow limitation courts have placed upon the "exigent circum-
stances" exception,'139 but also by the risk of being second-guessed
by judicial authorities at a later date as to whether the known
facts legally justified the search.140 In fact, the court reasoned
136. 2 W LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 97 (quoting Glen, 30 N.Y.2d at 258-60, 282 N.E.2d
at 617-18, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 661-62).
137. Garcma, 882 F.2d at 703.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Zabare, 871
F.2d 282 (2d Cir.), cert. denwed, 110 S. Ct. 161 (1989); Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177 (5th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Clement, 854 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988)).
140. Id. The facts that courts recognize as solid building blocks of probable cause
include:
1) Flight; 2) Furtive movements; 3) Hiding; 4) Attempt to destroy evidence;
5) Resistance to officers; 6) Admissions or confessions; 7) Evasive answers;
8) Unreasonable explanations; 9) Fingerprint identifications; 10) Hair follicle
identifications; 11) Handwriting comparisons; 12) Fabric comparisons; 13)
Identification of suspects by witnesses; 14) The emergency setting-crime
zone; 15) The emergency setting-automobile; 16) Ballistics evidence; 17)
Contraband or weapons in plain view; 18) Criminal record; 19) Hearsay
information-informant; 20) Hearsay information-fellow officer; 21) Hearsay
information -general; 22) Expert police opinion; 23) Police corroboration; 24)
Unusual or suspicious conduct; 25) Fact of crime or felony; 26) Police com-
puterized information (NCIC, etc.); 27) Police radio broadcasts; 28) Use of
drug-detecting dogs; 29) Voice print identifications; 30) Blood tests; 31)
Electronically obtained evidence.
J. CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 15 (1980).
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that anticipatory search warrants actually protect individual fourth
amendment rights by discouraging warrantless searches.' 4 '
Although holding that anticipatory search warrants were not
unconstitutional per se, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
"any warrant conditioned on what may occur in the future pres-
ents some potential for abuse."' In order to prevent such abuse,
"[m]agistrates and judges should . . take care to require inde-
pendent evidence giving rise to probable cause that the contra-
band will be located at the premises at the time of the search.' 43
The court offered several concrete suggestions as to how the
magistrate should make this critical determination.44 First,
affidavits supporting the application for an anticipatory [search]
warrant must show, not only that the agent believes a delivery
of contraband is going to occur, but also how he has obtained
this belief, how reliable his sources are, and what part govern-
ment agents will play in the delivery Judicial officers must
then scrutinize whether there is probable cause to believe that
the delivery will occur, and whether there is probable cause
to believe that the contraband will be located on the premises
when the search takes place.145
Second, "when an anticipatory [search] warrant is used, the
magistrate should protect against its premature execution by
listing in the warrant conditions governing the execution which
are explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunder-
standing or manipulation by government agents."'146 Third, and
finally, "magistrates must also carefully craft anticipatory [search]
warrants to limit the scope of the warrant-authorized search to
items which law enforcement officers have probable cause to
believe are located on the premises.' ' 47 Magistrates must pay
"careful heed" to the particularity requirement of the fourth
amendment.1'
The Second Circuit summarily dismissed the defendant's second
argument that the anticipatory search warrant was executed
141. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 703-04.
145. Id. at 703.
146. Id- at 703-04.
147. Id. at 704. Search warrants must contain descriptions reflecting "the most scru-
pulous exactitude." Id. (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
148. Id.
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prematurely 149 The warrant did not require that Wilson-Grant
take possession of the cocaine, nor did it require that Hooks and
Oliver relinquish possession. 150 The court concluded that Hooks
and Oliver's entering the apartment and placing the duffel bags
on the floor constituted a "sufficient delivery" to the premises,
thus fulfilling the warrant's condition and enabling the search. 151
Unsted States v. Goodwn52
In order to identify and prosecute individuals who receive child
pornography through the mail, the United States Postal Inspec-
tion Service set up the National Child Pornography Reverse
Sting Project.15 Postal inspectors used various means to identify
persons predisposed towards child pornography 154 Ralph Goodwin
came to the Postal Inspection Service's attention in 1983, when
he placed a suspicious advertisement in an issue of the Met
Forum, a now defunct Washington area swinger's magazine. 155
Goodwin was a white, middle-aged married man with four chil-
dren, employed by a large advertising firm, who spent over $100
a year on hard core pornography '- Goodwin indicated an interest
in both heterosexual and homosexual activity involving youths. 157
Based on substantial evidence of predisposition, the Far East-
ern Trading Company' 8 sent Goodwin a solicitation letter plainly
focused on child pornography, as well as a response coupon if
Goodwin wanted more information. 59 When Goodwin mailed back
the completed response form, the Far Eastern Trading Company




152. 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).
153. Id. at 34. This project was known as "Operation Looking Glass." Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The advertisement read: "Wanted: Lollitots, moppets & chicken magazines &
photographs. If you have single copies you want to sell, send your telephone number to
MP Code 3941." Id.
156. Id. at 35.
157. Id.
158. The Far Eastern Trading Company, Ltd., was a phony corporation that the
directors of Operation Looking Glass set up as an undercover child pornography mail
order firm. Id. at 34. Hong Kong was chosen as its location because of the substantial
quantity of child pornography that originates overseas. Id. In order to lend further
authenticity to the reverse sting operation, the directors of Operation Looking Glass
established a branch office in the Virgin Islands. Id.
159. Id. at 35.
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material.160 Goodwin ordered four magazines and enclosed a check
for eighty dollars. 161
Postal inspectors observed delivery of the magazines on June
10, 1987; a short time later, they executed a search warrant
which had been issued prior to the delivery 162 Goodwin chal-
lenged the anticipatory search warrant on the grounds that it
violated the fourth amendment because "probable cause to be-
lieve that the materials were at the house did not exist at the
time the warrant was issued."'1
The Fourth Circuit dismissed Goodwin's argument and held
that the lower court properly issued the search warrant.6 4 Agree-
ing with the Ninth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Hale,16 5
the court found the search warrant properly supported because
the pornography, in the hands of postal officials, was "on a sure
course to its destination."'166 The postal inspector's affidavit es-
tablished probable cause because it described the events planned
to effect delivery of the pornography and those events actually
occurred. 167
State Court
State courts also have examined the constitutionality of antic-
ipatory warrants, with the vast majority of cases involving the
receipt of drugs by mail or the delivery of drugs in person.168 A
160. Id. The catalogue vividly described seven video tapes, two films, and seven
magazines dealing with child pornography. Id. The government assembled all of the
pornographic material at Operation Looking Glass' facilities in Newark, New Jersey, from
material that the authorities had seized earlier. Id. at 34.
161. Id. at 35. The four magazines Goodwin ordered contained advertisements of
children depicted in sexually explicit situations. Id.
162. Id. at 35-36. The postal inspectors recovered, among other things, Goodwin's
correspondence with the Far Eastern Trading Company, the typewriter he used to type
letters to Far Eastern, and the two child pornography magazines that he received earlier
that day. Id The inspectors also recovered a large volume of nudist and sexually explicit
material depicting both children and adults. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 36-37.
165. 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986).
166. Goodunn, 854 F.2d at 36 (citing Hale, 784 F.2d at 1468).
167. Id.
168. See Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980); State v. Wright, 115 Idaho
1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); Commonwealth v. Soares, 384 Mass. 149, 424
N.E.2d 221 (1981); People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 282 N.E.2d 614, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Commonwealth v. Reviera, 387 Pa. Super. 196, 563 A.2d 1252
(1989).
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recent decision from the Idaho Court of Appeals summarized the
concerns about anticipatory search warrants. 16 9
State v. Wrght'70
In State v. Wght, an Idaho Falls policeman arrested Robert
Burnside on a drug-related charge in 1984.171 Subsequently, the
policeman received confidential information regarding Burnside
and others in that area who were reportedly involved in Burn-
side's drug organization, including the defendant, Ronald Wright.72
In August 1986, police officers obtained anticipatory search
warrants to search Burnside's vehicle and two residences, includ-
ing Wright's home.173 Two days after the warrants' issuance, the
search of Wright's house revealed marijuana cigarettes, meth-
amphetamine, and drug paraphernalia.174 Wright was charged
with possession of a controlled substance.175
Three judges wrote opinions in State v. Wght. 76 Chief Judge
Walters, writing the opinion of the court, upheld the anticipatory
search warrant.1 77 He cited People v. Glen 78 for the proposition
that obtaining an anticipatory search warrant before delivery of
the contraband is preferable to seizing the property without a
warrant upon the contraband's arrival. 79 Walters, however, in-
cluded a cautionary statement from Glen:
[W]here there is no present possession the supporting evidence
for the prospective warrant must be strong that the particular
possession of particular property will occur and that the ele-
ments to bring about that possession are in process and will
result in the possession at the time and place specified.
169. Wright, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1044, 772 P.2d at 251.
172. Id.
173. Id. The policeman's affidavit and testimony that Burnside planned to transport a
large quantity of narcotics from Boise to Idaho Falls within the following week formed
the basis for the warrants. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The trial court refused to suppress the evidence obtained during the search.
Id. at 1045, 772 P.2d at 252.
176. Id. at 1043-53, 772 P.2d at 250-60. Two of the judges "specially concurred" m order
to address the question of anticipatory search warrants. See snfra notes 182-202 and
accompanying text.
177. Id. at 1049, 772 P.2d at 256.
178. 30 N.Y.2d 252, 282 N.E.2d 614, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, cert. dented, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
179. Wrght, 115 Idaho at 1049, 772 P.2d at 256.
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Moreover, the issuing Judge should be satisfied that there is
no likelihood that the warrant will be executed prematurely 180
Walters found the anticipatory search warrant permissible be-
cause the evidence indicating that a prospective crime was to be
consummated was "logically and probatively strong" and because
he found little, if any, likelihood of premature execution of the
warrant.
181
Judge Swanstrom, specially concurring, faulted the issuing
magistrate because the anticipatory search warrant failed to
condition execution on some confirming event that would indicate
that Burnside had effected a "delivery" of drugs to Wright's
house.182 In issuing the warrant to search Wright's house, the
magistrate relied solely on the police officer's testimony that
Burnside would be returning to Idaho Falls from Boise with
narcotics. 183 Only later, at the suppression hearing, did the officer
testify that he planned to "wait until Robert Burnside had arrived
with the drugs" before searching Wright's residence.&I
For Swanstrom, this anticipatory search warrant left open too
great a possibility for premature execution. 8 5 Johnson v. Stcate,86
a 1980 case from the Supreme Court of Alaska, provided the
solution:
For an anticipatory warrant to be valid, there must be probable
cause to believe that the items to be seized will be at the
place to be searched at the time the warrant is executed, or
in other words, that the warrant will not be prematurely
executed. We think it most appropriate in anticipatory
warrant situations, that the magistrate insert a direction in
the search warrant making execution contingent on the hap-
pening of an event which evidences probable cause that the
item to be seized is in the place to be searched, rather than
directing that the warrant be executed immediately or forth-
with.'1'
Swanstrom found probable cause lacking because the magistrate
had not included an instruction conditioning the warrant's exe-
180. Id. (citing Ge, 30 N.Y.2d at 259, 282 N.E.2d at 617, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 661).
181. Id.
182. Id. (Swanstrom, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 1050, 772 P.2d at 257 (Swanstrom, J., concurring).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980).
187. Id. at 1124 n.11.
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cution upon the happening of some event.188 Furthermore, Swan-
strom reasoned that the police also had no probable cause at the
time of execution because the officer, after finding very few
narcotics in Burnside's car, relied upon the weak "negative in-
ference" that a delivery must have been made to Wright's home
prior to the search of the car 18
Judge Burnett, also specially concurring, specifically articulated
the underlying concerns about anticipatory search warrants. 190
Finding that such warrants were not unconstitutional per se,
Burnett identified three risks inherent in anticipatory warrants. 191
The first danger is premature issuance of the warrant based
upon mere speculation of future criminal activity 192 According to
Burnett, admonishing judges to require a particularized showing
of probable cause would solve this problem.193 The second risk is
that police officers may assume an important judicial function of
magistrates-the determination of probable cause that the ob-
jects to be seized are located at the place to be searched. 194
Burnett opined that combining a specific showing, of probable
cause to search with a specified event to trigger the search would
avoid this problem.195 The triggering event "prevent[s] the police
from weighing evidence obtained after the warrant's issuance, in
188. Wnght, 115 Idaho at 1051, 772 P.2d at 258 (Swanstrom, J., concurring).
189. Id.
190. Id. (Burnett, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 1051-52, 772 P.2d at 258-59 (Burnett, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 1051, 772 P.2d at 258 (Burnett, J., concurring).
193. Id. The Second Circuit's opinion on this issue in United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d
699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989), bears repeating here:
[We] recognize that any warrant conditioned on what may occur in the future
presents some potential for abuse. Magistrates and judges should therefore
take care to require independent evidence giving rise to probable cause that
the contraband will be located at the premises at the time of the search.
This means that affidavits supporting the application for an anticipatory
warrant must show, not only that the agent believes a delivery of contraband
is going to occur, but also how he has obtained this belief, how reliable his
sources are, and what part government agents will play in the delivery.
Judicial officers must then scrutinize whether there is probable cause to
believe that the delivery will occur, and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the contraband will be located on the premises when the search
takes place.
194. Wrght, 115 Idaho at 1052, 772 P.2d at 259 (Burnett, J., concurring). The Ninth
Circuit also identified this concern in United States v. Hendrcks: "Defendant accurately
perceives the vice of the prospective search warrant: By issuing such a warrant, the
magistrate abdicates to the DEA agents an important judicial function-the determination
that probable cause exists to believe that the objects are currently in the place to be
searched." 743 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dented, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985).
195. Wrght, 115 Idaho at 1052, 772 P.2d at 259 (Burnett, J., concurring).
806
ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS
determining for themselves when the search should occur."'196 The
third danger is premature execution of the warrant, before the
evidence is at the place or in the possession of the person to be
searched.197 Once again, Burnett believed that specification of a
triggering event would minimize this risk.9"
Swanstrom and Burnett agreed that the anticipatory search
warrant for Wright's residence was invalid for lack of probable
cause. 99 In addition, both were disturbed that the magistrate's
failure to specify an event, time, or set of circumstances that
would trigger the future execution of the warrant might lead to
premature execution.20 Nevertheless, they concurred in the de-
nial of the motion to suppress based upon United States v. Leon2°'
and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.20 2
ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS:
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND PROPRIETY
The question remains, however, whether anticipatory search
warrants are constitutional. The answer is yes, if officials prop-
erly craft them. Under certain circumstances, however, an antic-
ipatory search warrant may be unconstitutional, such as when
officials poorly craft the warrant. In addition, a constitutional
taint can arise from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
warrant's execution.
Constitutwnality
If the police wait too long before executing a search warrant
or if the information supporting the warrant is too old to furnish




199. Id. at 1051-53, 772 P.2d at 258-60 (Burnett, J., concurring). As Burnett stated, "The
probable cause affidavit and accompanying testimony were long on quantity of information
depicting Wright's association with a drug dealer, Burnside, but short on quality of
information showing that the evidence sought would be at the place (Wright's house) to
be searched." Id. at 1052-53, 772 P.2d at 259-60 (Burnett, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 1049-53, 772 P.2d at 256-60 (Swanstrom and Burnett, JJ., concurring).
201. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
202. Wrzght, 115 Idaho at 1051, 1053, 772 P.2d at 258, 260 (Swanstrom and Burnett,
JJ., concurring). The outcome of Wright, in the face of clear constitutional violations, is
a prime example of how the good faith exception can swallow up the exclusionary rule.
203. See United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1984). As the Fourth
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warrant fails because of the excessive delay between the obser-
vation of criminal activity and the issuance of the warrant.2 0 4 The
anticipatory search warrant is the polar opposite of the stale
search warrant. Defendants invariably attack anticipatory search
warrants because the criminal activity that would give rise to
probable cause has not yet occurred. 205 In determining the con-
stitutionality of any warrant, timeliness is a key concern.206
Confusion over the timeliness issue centers on the phrase
"present probable cause. '207 Specifically, the interpretation of the
word "present" creates the confusion. On the one hand, "present"
might mean simply that probable cause exists to support a search;
on the other hand, it might mean that probable cause exists that
certain items are presently located at the premises to'be searched.
The former interpretation is correct.208 The final conclusion that
items sought under the search warrant are located at the place
to be searched can and should be separated from the initial
finding of probable cause to search.20 9
Although it concerns the staleness issue, Sgro v. Unsted States210
is an instructive case. Sgro involved a warrant to search for
Circuit noted in McCall,
Cases in which staleness becomes an issue arise in two different contexts.
First, the facts alleged in the warrant may have been sufficient to establish
probable cause when the warrant was issued, but the government's delay in
executing the warrant possibly tainted the search. Second, the warrant itself
may be suspect because the information on which it rested was arguably
too old to furnish "present" probable cause.
Id. at 1336 (citations omitted).
204. See generally 2 W LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 75-88 (indicating that staleness can
be a function of several factors, including amount of time that has passed since the crime,
continuity of the criminal activity under investigation, opportunity to remove or destroy
contraband, and nature of the place to be searched).
205. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Mascolo, The Staleness of Probable Cause sn Affidavits for Search
Warrants: Resolmng the Issue of Timeliness, 43 CONN. B.J. 189 (1969) (timely showing of
probable cause, based upon fresh facts, necessary for issuance of valid search warrant).
207. See, e.g., McCall, 740 F.2d at 1336 ("[T]he warrant itself may be suspect because
the information on which it rested was arguably too old to furnish 'present' probable
cause"); 2 W LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 95 (presenting the argument that "the Fourth
Amendment has been violated because there was no showing of probable cause but
instead only a showing that such cause might be present upon some future occasion").
208. McCall, 740 F.2d at 1336 (reviewing court "must determine whether information
sufficient to constitute probable cause was ever presented").
209. See United States v. Solario, 577 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit
stated that in determining probable cause, the magistrate is not required to determine
whether the items that the police are searching for are in fact located at the premises
to be searched, but only whether reasonable ground exists to believe that they are there.
Id.
210. 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
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intoxicating liquors.21' Declaring the warrant invalid,212 the Su-
preme Court stated that "it is manifest that the proof must be
of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant
as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. Whether
the proof meets this test must be determined by the circum-
stances of each case."213
Sgro is instructive because the critical inquiry in determining
timeliness is not whether the allegedly criminal acts occurred in
the past or are likely to occur in the future, but only whether
they relate closely to the time of the warrant's issuance. On
either side of the actual signing of the warrant, either past or
future activity can support a finding of probable cause. Unsup-
ported and merely speculative activity, however, can make a
finding of probable cause impossible.
For these reasons, most courts and leading commentators have
agreed that anticipatory search warrants are not per se uncon-
stitutional, although the probable cause that the magistrate finds
will come into existence only upon the occurrence of a future
event.21 4 When a court reviews a probable cause determination
and looks exclusively at the exact instant that the magistrate's
pen touches the paper, its focus becomes too narrow. In cases
similar to Garsa,215 when police officers explicitly laid out the
details of a controlled delivery of narcotics before the magis-
211. Id. at 208-10.
212. The court initially issued the warrant on July 6, 1926, supported by an affidavit
alleging the purchase of a beer on the premises on June 29, 1926. Id. at 207-08. The court
reissued the warrant on July 27. Id. at 207. The Supreme Court held that the warrant
was void because execution occurred three weeks after original issuance. Id. at 212.
213. Id. at 210-11.
214. See, e.g., People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 282 N.E.2d 614, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656, Cert.
dented, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); 2 W LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 95-97. Glen involved an
anticipatory search warrant issued prior to the delivery by bus of a package containing
narcotics. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d at 257, 282 N.E.2d at 616, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 659. Courts upholding
anticipatory search warrants often cite Glen for the conclusion that
[i]n cases like these, the certainty of future possession is greater or is often
greater than that based on information of past and presumably current
possession. [ln many kinds of organized crime the evidence supplied to
obtain warrants does not relate to current crimes but past crimes with
circumstances showing the likelihood of continuance of the same activity. In
the present cases the evidence that there would be a consummated prospec-
tive crime was logidally and probatively stronger.
Id. at 259-60, 282 N.E.2d at 617-18, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 661. This case was also the subject
of what appears to be the only other article dealing with this precise area of the law.
See Note, Crmsnal Procedure-Search and Sezzure-Pospective Search Warrants, 19
WAYNE L. REV. 1339 (1973).
215. United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989).
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trate,2 16 the anticipatory search warrant was constitutional.217
When the information supplied to the magistrate indicates that
contraband is on a sure course to the premises that the officer
wants to search, an anticipatory search warrant can satisfy the
requirements of the fourth amendment.21 8
Pro pmety
"Uncontrolled" Delvertes
Although not unconstitutional per se, anticipatory search war-
rants do present several potential pitfalls. For instance, some
situations simply do not lend themselves to controlled deliveries.
In United States v. Hendncks,2 9 a customs officer in Los An-
geles inspected a cardboard box that arrived from Brazil and
was addressed to Dennis Hendricks.20 The manner of shipment
required Hendricks to pick up the box personally 2 After finding
cocaine hidden inside the box, the inspector turned over the
entire package to the DEA.2 On the basis of this and other
evidence subsequently gathered, and with full knowledge that
the box was in the possession of DEA agents, a magistrate issued
a warrant for a search of Hendricks' residence.2
Execution of the anticipatory search warrant was conditional:
"this search warrant is to be executed only upon the condition
216. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
217. See 2 W LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 95-96.
218. Some coprts have disagreed. See supra note 13 and cases cited therein. As the
court stated in United States v. Roberts, 333 F Supp. 786 (E.D. Tenn. 1971),
It is well settled that a requirement for the issuance of a search warrant
is that the facts submitted by affidavit m the application for the warrant be
sufficient to justify the conclusion that the property which is the object of
the search is probably on the person or premises to be searched at the time
the warrant is issued. A search warrant will not issue upon an affidavit
reciting only the anticipation of a future offense. Rather the allegations of
a search warrant apply to conditions existing "at the time of the issuance
of the warrant."
Id. at 787-88 (quoting Coyne v. Watson, 282 F Supp. 235, 238 (S.D. Ohio 1967), aff'd, 392
F.2d 585 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968)).
This Note agrees that anticipatory search warrants are not per se unconstitutional and
does not advocate an absolute rule against their use. Instead, this Note advocates strict
judicial control when law enforcement personnel use anticipatory search warrants due to
the potential for abuse.
219. 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985).
220. Id. at 653.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 653-54.
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that the above described box s brought to the aforesaid prem-
ises. ' '2 4 The DEA agents therefore had to call Hendricks to ask
him to pick up the suitcase.2 5 Hendricks moved to suppress the
evidence obtained when the DEA ultimately executed the antic-
ipatory search warrant. 26
In Hendrwks, the Ninth Circuit properly ruled that the mag-
istrate issued the anticipatory search warrant without probable
cause because of the uncertainty of delivery to Hendricks' resi-
dence.m By calling Hendricks to pick up the suitcase, the DEA
created probable cause to search the house.2 The court analo-
gized this situation to one in which police created exigent cir-
cumstances and then used the exigencies to justify a search.22
The court conceded that issuance of the warrant would have
been proper if (1) the suitcase was in the house, (2) probable
cause existed for the belief that the suitcase was in the house,
or (3) the DEA knew that the suitcase was on a sure course to
the house23° The issuing magistrate knew, however, that the
suitcase was in the possession of the DEA agents, not at the
house.?-" In issuing the warrant with such knowledge, the court
stated, "The magistrate abdicates to the DEA agents an impor-
tant judicial function-the determination that probable cause
exists to believe that the objects are currently in the place to
be searched."2 2 The court called this abdication the "vice of the
prospective search warrant."
A magistrate's abdication of control in a situation like Hendrcks
erodes both respect for judicial authority and general trust in
constitutional protections. Although police discretion may seem
to facilitate police surveillance, thereby helping to capture per-
sons involved in the drug trade, the heavy price of reduced
constitutional protection may haunt our society later As noted
in Mapp v. Oho,2 "Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its




228. Id. at 654 n.i.
229. Id. (citing United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980)).
230. Id. at 654-55.
231. Id. at 654. Apparently, the magistrate also knew that Hendricks was required to
pick up the package. Id. at 653.
232. Id. at 655.
233. Id.
234. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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disregard of the charter of its own existence." 5 Unfortunately,
anticipatory search warrants invite the kind of police overreach-
ing that the Supreme Court foresaw in Mapp.
Statwnary Contraband
Another argument in support of anticipatory search warrants
is that the time required to obtain a warrant presents major
practical difficulties for law enforcement officials.26 As the Sec-
ond Circuit noted in Unsted States v. Garma,27 "In many instances,
the speed with which government agents are required to act,
'especially when dealing with the furtive and transitory activities
of persons who traffic in narcotics,' demands that they proceed
without a warrant or risk losing both criminal and contraband."
This argument may hold true for drug cases, but for child
pornography cases, it is certainly debatable, if not wholly false.
In United States v. Goodunn,29 the Fourth Circuit ruled that
an anticipatory search warrant was valid in a child pornography
reverse sting operation.?A° The Ninth Circuit's holding in United
States v. Hale241 formed the basis for the Fourth Circuit's decision.
In Hale, the court upheld an anticipatory search warrant for child
pornography, explaining that when the contraband to be seized
is "on a sure course to its destination, as in the mail, the prior
issuance of a warrant is permissible."' 2
Better reasoning appeared in Unsted States v. Flbppen,23 in
which the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia rejected the Hale analysis and declared that antici-
patory search warrants in child pornography cases are unconsti-
tutional under the fourth amendment. " In Flppen, the court
qualitatively distinguished drugs and child pornography.25 In
most cases, drugs are either used or immediately distributed
235. Id. at 659.
286. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. densed, 110 S. Ct.
348 (1989).
237. 882 F.2d 699.
238. Id. at 703 (quoting W LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 700 (1978)).
239. 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
240. Goodunn, 854 F.2d at 36.
241. 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 479 U.S. 829 (1986).
242. Id. at 1468; accord United States v. Hendricks, 748 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
dented, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985) (invalidating an anticipatory search warrant because the
delivery and receipt of contraband was uncertain).
243. 674 F Supp. 536 (E.D. Va. 1987), affid mm., 861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988).




upon delivery.26 If government officials may not seize drugs
immediately upon delivery, the evidence may disappear during
the delay in procuring a search warrant.2 47 Child pornography,
however, is not used or distributed upon delivery.m The affidavit
that the postal inspector submitted to secure the search warrant
stated that "recipients of child pornography 'rarely dispose of
their collection of sexually-explicit material .. They almost
always maintain and possess their collection of materials in the
privacy and security of their own homes.' "29
According to this district court, the child pornography situation
therefore provides government officials with the time to pursue
a search warrant through normal channels, unlike drug situa-
tions.2 0 For the court in Flippen, "allowing anticipatory search
warrants in this area unnecessarily diminishes the Fourth Amend-
ment right of the people to be secure from 'unreasonable searches
and seizures.' ",251 This reasoning is precisely what the Supreme
Court should use to limit the scope and use of anticipatory
warrants.
Whenever possible, the police should pursue the "normal"
warrant procedure, especially when they know that the disposal
of the contraband will take some time. Perhaps by discouraging
anticipatory search warrants in this type of situation, the Court
would send a message, not that child pornographers are any less
morally reprehensible or deserving of capture than drug dealers,
but that judicial control over the probable cause determination
is critical to proper maintenance of fourth amendment protec-
tions. In this small way, the Court could halt the recent tendency
to exalt increased police flexibility over individual fourth amend-
ment protections.
The Court has long recognized society's strong desire to en-
courage the police, whenever possible, to obtain judicial approval




249. Id. at 539-40 (quoting Affidavits of Gerald Dexter for Search Warrants, at 2).
250. Id. at 540.
251. Id.
252. See 2 W LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 96. Professor LaFave finds the reasoning in
Alvidres v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 575, 581, 90 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685-86 (1970), to
be most persuasive on this point:
The entire thrust of the exclusionary rule and the cases which have applied
it is to encourage the use of search warrants by law enforcement officials.
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icy cannot be challenged seriously Implementing this policy with
anticipatory search warrants that do not strictly circumscribe
police behavior, however, may be of little value. For any antici-
patory warrant, future events are critical to the probable cause
determination. If the police wholly manage those future events,
then the probable cause determination has been placed into the
hands of officials who should not have such control. In seeking a
warrant, the police objective to prevent crime should be manifest;
in that same situation, the magistrate must protect constitutional
rights.
ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Fourth amendment jurisprudence has generally retreated from
the principles envisioned by the Framers of the amendment.
Furthermore, courts dealing with the relatively recent phenom-
enon of anticipatory search warrants, although not categorically
rejecting them, have been wary of the potential for abuse that
they create. Finally, review of certain factual situations reveals
that anticipatory search warrants are simply inappropriate in
some cases. Given such a backdrop, this Note proposes a solution2
One of the major difficulties which confronts law enforcement in the
attempt to comply with court enunciated requirements for a "reasonable"
search and seizure is the time that is consumed in obtaining search warrants.
The speed with which law enforcement is often required to act, especially
when dealing with the furtive and transitory activities of persons who traffic
in narcotics, demands that the courts make every effort to assist law
enforcement in complying with the edicts that the courts themselves have
issued.
We must ask ourselves whether the objective of the rule is better served
by permitting officers under circumstances similar to the case at bar to
obtain a warrant in advance of the delivery of the narcotic or by forcing
them to go to the scene without a warrant and there make a decision at the
risk of being second-guessed by the judiciary if they are successful in
recovering evidence or contraband. We believe that achievement of the goals
whichour high court had in mind in adopting the exclusionary evidence rule
is best attained by permitting officers to seek warrants in advance when
they can clearly demonstrate that their right to search will exist within a
reasonable time in the future. Nowhere in either the federal or state
constitutions, nor in the Statutes of California, is there any language which
would appear to prohibit the issuance of a warrant to search at a future
time.
2 W LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 96.
253. LaFave and several courts have suggested that one solution may lie in police use
of telephonic warrants. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 655 n.2 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. dented, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985); Flippen, 674 F Supp. at 540 n.4; 2 W LAFAVE,
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that addresses both the stated and unstated concerns surrounding
anticipatory search warrants.
Some elements of the proposal relate to the issuing magistrate.
For instance, magistrates must know what is required for the
particularized showing of probable cause that supports an antic-
ipatory search warrant. This and other requirements, although
not exhaustive, should provide magistrates with enough guidance
to eliminate largely the dangers inherent in the anticipatory
search warrant. The standard for any magistrate involved in the
possible issuance of such a warrant is strict, rigorous, and thor-
ough scrutiny
Other elements of the proposal relate to the police officer(s)
involved. Police must understand what they can and cannot do,
upon both application for the anticipatory search warrant and
execution of the warrant. Here again, restraint, rather than
increased flexibility, must be the watchword.
Finally, all of the elements apply to any comprehensive review
of the process by judges either at suppression hearings or at the
appellate level. Those judges who look at the anticipatory search
warrant procedure with the benefit of hindsight must be mindful
of the rigorous restrictions placed upon such warrants at the
outset.
Proposed Soluton
The Magstrate must find probable cause that a delivery will
occur
72 4
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate must
strictly scrutinize the reliability and credibility of the mdepend-
supra note 9, at 99. As the name suggests, telephonic warrants involve the police
telephoning a judge or magistrate from the scene of the crime after they personally
observe criumnal activity and believe enough evidence establishes probable cause to
search. See United States v. McGriff, 678 F Supp. 1010, 1013-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); see also
Alpert, Telephonw Search Warrants, 38 U. MIAMi L. REv. 625 (1984) (discussing the
prospects and problems associated with telephonic search warrants, concluding that such
warrants could become an important nddle ground between traditional warrant proce-
dures and warrantless searches). Unfortunately, the difficult logistics of procuring a
telephonic search warrant are sometimes impossible to overcome given the irregularity
of police working hours and the possible risks of alerting the criminals involved. See
United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1279 n.6 (9th Cir. 1986) (obtaining telephonic
warrant impractical despite the fact that officers spent approxmately three hours at the
location before making their initial entry). Telephonic warrants, as an alternative to
anticipatory search warrants, do not appear to be a viable long-term solution.
254. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 110 S. Ct.
348 (1989); supra notes 114-51 and accompanying text.
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ent information presented. As the Second Circuit noted m Garma,
the affidavits supporting the application for the anticipatory
search warrant must show the following: a) the agent's belief
that the delivery will occur; b) the agent's basis for this belief;
c) the reliability of the agent's sources; and d) the part govern-
ment agents will play in the delivery 255 The warrant must not
put the police officers involved into a position in which their
actions "create" probable cause. Specifically, in order to avoid a
situation like that in Hendrscks,21 a magistrate may not issue an
anticipatory search warrant without proof of an intended deliv-
ery
Executson must be contsngent upon a tr.ggertng event 257
The triggering event must be "explicit, clear and narrowly
drawn to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government
agents."258 The magistrate must make clear to the officer(s) in-
volved that the specified event must occur precisely as outlined
in the body of the warrant. The police must not be able to
substitute their own judgment as to the existence of probable
cause for that of the issuing magistrate. This element of the
proposal will prevent premature execution. 259
The police must accurately estimate the tsme of the delsvery260
Magistrates must avoid vague, open-ended warrants. As Sgro
v. Unsted States261 revealed, the facts delineated in the officer's
supporting affidavit must be "closely related to the time of the
issue of the warrant in order to maintain probable cause. '26 2 The
issuing magistrate must limit the executive "window of oppor-
tunity" to as short a time as possible. Concern over police
overreaching and desire for judicial control of the probable cause
determination support a forty-eight hour limit.263
255. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04.
256. See Hendrcks, 743 F.2d 653; supra notes 219-35 and accompanying text.
257. See State v. Wright, 115 Idaho 1043, 1052, 772 P.2d 250, 259 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)
(Burnett, J., concurring); supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
258. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
259. See Garcm, 882 F.2d at 703-04; Wmght, 115 Idaho at 1052, 772 P.2d at 259 (Burnett,
J., concurring).
260. See Note, supra note 214, at 1348.
261. 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
262. Id. at 210.
263. This standard is admittedly arbitrary. This issue is an appropriate subject for
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The polsce must show a clear likelihood of smmediate
distributwn of the contraband sn questson2
The potential problems with anticipatory search warrants should
encourage police to follow normal warrant procedures whenever
possible. In situations involving contraband such as child pornog-
raphy, which is rarely disposed of or distributed,2 65 the need for
quick action is greatly diminished. Consequently, magistrates
should not issue anticipatory search warrants in such cases.
If the tmggemng event fails to occur, the antscipatory search
warrant ss void, and the polsce must revusit the sssusng
magtstrate before proceeding266
This element flows logically from the second element of the
proposal-contingency upon a triggering event. The issuing mag-
istrate must make clear to the officer(s) involved that no amount
of logical supposition or inference can save an anticipatory search
warrant if the triggering event does not occur. The triggering
event is the lifeline for the probable cause underlying the antic-
ipatory search warrant; once the lifeline is cut, the warrant is
dead.
If the trggemng event fails to occur, the good faith excepton 26 7
to the excluszonary rule shall not apply268
This element of the proposal affects the judges who review
anticipatory search warrants during suppression hearings or when
evidentiary questions are heard on appeal. This rule fits within
the well-accepted "exception to the exception" that Justice White
recognized in United States v. Leon26 9: no officer may execute a
search warrant when the warrant is so facially deficient that the
legislative action should Congress choose to place a time limit on the execution of
anticipatory search warrants. At present, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure place
a 10-day limit on the execution of normal search warrants. FED. R. CRni. P 41(c)(1).
264. See United States v. Flippen, 674 F Supp. 536, 539-40 (E.D. Va. 1987), affid mem.,
861 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1988).
265. Id.
266. See United States v. Moore, 742 F Supp. 727, 735 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); infra notes
307-10 and accompanying text.
267. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); supra notes 105-1 and
accompanying text.
268. See Moore, 742 F Supp. at 738; 'nfra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
269. 468 U.S. 897.
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officer cannot reasonably presume it is valid.20 If the reviewing
judge faces a situation in which the officer in question proceeded
with a search after the specified triggering event failed to occur
and, more to the point, after the issuing magistrate admonished
the officer not to do so, then the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule should not allow admission of the incriminating
evidence. In the face of restraints on the use of anticipatory
search warrants, such conduct by an officer of the law would be
patently improper Given that the Supreme Court adopted the
exclusionary rule to curb police misconduct, this element of the
proposal would well serve the purposes of the rule.
Applscatson
A recent decision in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York clearly illustrates the potential
impact of the proposed solution. Unsted States v. Moore7' involved
a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a narcotics investiga-
tion.22 This decision, although embodying most of the elements
of the proposed solution, illustrates the nearly total erosion of
fourth amendment protections.
The Facts of Moore
On June 7, 1989, Sergeant Robert Kroll of the East Greenbush
Police Department received a phone call from Paul Irwin, a police
officer in El Paso, Texas.2 3 Irwin informed Kroll that trained
narcotics dogs had identified two United Parcel Service (UPS)
packages, addressed to Joseph Donahue, 100 Orchard St., Apt.
C1, Rensselaer, New YorkY 4 Kroll consulted with Detective Tim
Murphy, a member of the Albany Police Department, and typed
a search warrant application 2 5
270. Id. at 923. The other "exceptions to the exception" that Justice White recognized
were: (1) when the police officer knowingly made false statements in his supporting
affidavit; (2) when the issuing magistrate was neither neutral nor detached; and (3) when
the affidavit supporting the warrant was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Id.
271. 742 F Supp. 727.
272. Id. at 729.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 730. Donahue was one of three defendants in the case, the other two being
James Carrington and William Moore. Id. at 727.
275. Id. at 730.
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The application requested permission to search Donahue's per-
son, his apartment, and any of his storage areas. 76 The application
described the objects of the search to be the two boxes from El
Paso, as well as "any and all records or documents related to
this scheme."' ' 7 In order to lend factual support, Kroll included
his conversation with Irwin, the El Paso officer, in the applica-
tion.27 The application also stated that Kroll had known Donahue
professionally for fifteen years, that Kroll had seen Donahue
arriving and leaving from 100 Orchard Street, and that the
telephone company confirmed that Donahue had purchased phone
service for 100 Orchard Street. 9
The next morning at the Latham, New York, UPS facility,
several police officers, including Kroll and Murphy, inspected the
packages when they arrived from Texas. 28 Each package con-
tained two sealed coolers, which in turn contained bricks of
marijuana.281 The officers resealed the packages and formulated
a plan to arrest Donahue after he accepted delivery of the
packages.
22
Before proceeding, Murphy penned a handwritten addendum
to the original warrant application typed by Kroll.2 Kroll and
his partner, Michael Davidson, then drove to the office of Charles
Assim, Town Justice for the Town of East Greenbush.m Kroll
signed the warrant application in the car and waited while
276. Id.
277. Id. at 730-31. The application described the boxes, including their weight and




280. Id. at 730. When trained narcotics dogs again identified the two suspect packages,
Detective Rena Epting obtained a separate warrant to open the packages. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. The plan involved another Albany detective, who would don a UPS uniform
and make a controlled delivery of the packages to Donahue's apartment with a UPS
security guard. Id.
283. Id. at 731. The handwritten addendum read as follows:
On 8 June 1989 Det. Epting of the Albany Police dept. S.I.U. along with his/
her K-9 partner (Boa or E'Rufus" crossed out]) conducted a certified inspection
resulting in a positive affirmation. A search warrant was obtained and the
contents of the packages were inspected.
Contents Lssted As Follows: Blue Thermos Brand Cooler Contaimng a
Number of Full & 1/2 Bricks of marijuana. See attached Polaroid Photo
Packages subsequently resealed; while in police custody, and shipped to
Jos. Donahue (this application) who accepted same. Packages from time of
inspection to acceptance by Donahue were continuously and constantly in
Policy Custody.
Id
284. Id. at 730. Kroll had called Assin earlier and informed him that law enforcement
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Davidson presented the application to Judge Assim.s 5 Assin
reviewed the application and asked Davidson several questions.M
Assini then signed the warrant,m but failed to sign the jurat,
the certification next to Kroll's signature.2"
Soon after Kroll and Davidson returned to Rensselaer, Albany,
Detective Thomas Blair, posing as a UPS employee, attempted
the controlled delivery at 100 Orchard Street.s 9 When no one
answered the door, Blair returned to the UPS facility with the
packages, with Kroll and Davidson, who intended to stake out
the facility and wait for Donahue, following soon after.m
At that point, events took a strange twist. Around noon, after
Blair returned to the UPS facility with the packages but before
Kroll and Davidson could return to set up their stakeout, an
individual later identified as Scott Rehm arrived at the UPS
facility and claimed to be Donahue.2' Rehm signed for the pack-
ages, and Blair helped carry the packages to Rehm's car, noting
its make, model, and license number 29 Blair then radioed to Kroll
that Donahue had picked up the two packages; however, when
Blair described the individual who signed for the packages, Kroll
immediately responded that the person described was definitely
not Donahue.2 s
Kroll was the only officer in position to follow Rehm when he
left the UPS facility 294After proceeding calmly for a few miles,
Rehm accelerated to a high rate of speed, eventually eluding
officials had monitored the progress of the suspect packages since they were first
identified in El Paso. Id. at 731.
285. Id. at 730.
286. Id. at 731. In response to these questions, Davidson informed Assim that the
delivery was imminent and that the officers wished to obtain the warrant in order to
serve it at the time of delivery. I&
287. Id.
288. Id. at 735. The jurat read: "Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8[th] day of
June, 1989." Id. at 730 n.3.
289. Id. at 731.
290. Id. at 731-32. Rather than leave the packages with Donahue's landlord, who offered
to accept them, Blair left a UPS sticker on the door of Donahue's apartment, which
stated that UPS had attempted a delivery and returned the packages to the UPS facility
in Latham. Id. Several members of the East Greenbush Police Department kept Donahue's
residence under surveillance after this failed delivery attempt. Id. at 732. The surveillance
was not wholly effective, however, because the police did not have enough personnel to
watch every door that led to Donahue's apartment. Id.
291. Id. at 731-32.





Kroll; the police never saw the packages again after they were
loaded into Rehm's car.2 5
At approximately 5:30 p.m., Kroll and several other officers
executed the warrant signed by Assim, seizing coolers similar to
the ones found inside the packages at Latham.26 They also seized
drugs, drug paraphernalia, and records.97 At trial, Donahue moved
to suppress the evidence.25
The Dec'son
The district court noted that the warrant signed by Assim
was partially anticipatory, in relation to the suspect packages,
and partially nonanticipatory, in relation to the "records and
documents" connected with the scheme.2 99 According to the court,
under the standards established in Unsted States v. Garcsa,3 00 the
anticipatory portion of the search warrant violated the fourth
amendment for three reasons.3 01
First, the handwritten addendum indicated falsely that the
packages had been delivered to and accepted by the defendant.30 2
Second, the government did not show that Davidson answered
Assini's questions under oath, as required by the fourth amend-
ment, thus preventing any consideration of Davidson's state-
ments.30 3 Without these statements, Assim could not know by
reading the body of the warrant application how the drugs were
to be delivered or even that the drugs were " 'on a sure course
of delivery.' ",304 Third, and most importantly, the officers never
observed the delivery of the packages to Donahue's residence 0 5
Because the warrant was contingent upon a delivery that never
occurred, the court reasoned that the anticipatory portion of the
warrant was void.306
295. Id.
296. Id. Kroll entered Donahue's apartment through a window and quickly found the
defendant. Id.
297. Id. At approximately the same time, Davidson located Rehm in East Greenbush
and questioned hun, but Rehm did not have the packages. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 733.
300. 882 F.2d 699 (2d. Cir.), cert. dented, 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989); see supra notes 128-51
and accompanying text.
301. Moore, 742 F Supp. at 734-35.
302. Id. at 734.
303. Id. at 734-35.
304. Id. (quoting United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986)).
305. Id.
306. Id. The court noted that neither party addressed the affidavit's most glaring
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The court also held that the police had a duty to report back
to Assini after losing track of Rehm's car and before executing
the anticipatory portion of the warrant.3 7 Citing Second Circuit
precedent,3 08 the court placed a duty on police to report new or
corrective information to the issuing magistrate when this infor-
mation would have a bearing upon the probable cause determi-
nation.30 9 As the court artfully noted, "[A]nticipated probable
cause vanished with the car "310
The court also found that no information in the warrant appli-
cation supported the nonanticipatory portion of the search war-
rant relating to records and documents.3 11 Specifically, because
the warrant application mentioned nothing about the possibility
that Donahue might be packaging drugs for resale, or any other
drug activity involving his apartment, no indicia of probable cause
justified the search based upon the nonanticipatory portions of
the document.3 12 Accordingly, the court found that the entire
search warrant and its execution violated the guarantees of the
fourth amendment.3 13
The court then went on to determine whether the Leon good
faith exception should apply.31 4 As for the anticipatory portion of
the search warrant, the court concluded that a reasonably well-
trained officer in Kroll's position would have known that the
search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. 315 Kroll
knew that the delivery of the drugs to Donahue's home was
critical to triggering probable cause and that no delivery in fact
occurred.3 1 The court cited Garcia as controlling on this point:
if the planned event does not transpire, an anticipatory warrant
is void.317
omission. Because Assim never signed the jurat, the court had no indication that the
officers presented the affidavit under oath. The court believed that "[oln this ground,
both the anticipatory and nonanticipatory aspects of the warrant contravened] fourth
amendment principles." Id.
307. Id. at 736.
308. United States v. Marm-Buitrado, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2d Cir. 1984).
309. Moore, 742 F Supp. at 736.
310. Id.




315. Id. at 738.
316. Id.




Despite the foregoing reasoning, the court ultimately found
that the good faith exception applied to the nonanticipatory
portion of the search warrant and denied Donahue's motion to
suppress. 18 The court believed that the officers could rely on
Assini's probable cause determination that records and docu-
ments would be present in the apartment, 19 despite its own
earlier holding that the officers did not present Assini with
sufficient facts to demonstrate a fair probability that such records
or documents would be found at Donahue's residence.30 The court
feebly attempted to justify the outcome by pointing to the Su-
preme Court's statement in Leon that "'[r]easonable minds fre-
quently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit
establishes probable cause.' "321 The bottom line remained that a
clear violation of the fourth amendment had once again gone
uncorrected.
Aftermath
The district court in Moore adhered to several elements of this
Note's proposed solution to the problem of anticipatory search
warrants. Reliance on Garcia, perhaps the clearest endorsement
yet for strict control over anticipatory search warrants,32 par-
tially explains the court's proper review of the matter. Even so,
the court was determined to find a way to deny the defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence.
Clearly, the court should have granted the motion. The non-
anticipatory portion of the warrant was entirely dependent upon
the anticipatory portion, and no amount of good faith should save
a search warrant, whether anticipatory or nonanticipatory, that
was as thoroughly tainted by fourth amendment violations as the
one written and executed by Kroll and Murphy.
Years of gradual disregard and disrespect, for fourth amend-
ment protections have encouraged the type of fishing expedition
seen in Moore, in which a court went to great lengths to include
evidence against an individual charged with a drug-related crime.
In a way, the many individual retreats from fourth amendment
guarantees have had a negative, synergistic effect, leaving the
318. Moore, 742 F Supp. at 739.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)).
322. See supra notes 114-51 and accompanying text.
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fourth amendment more like a broken shell than the rugged
armor that its Framers envisioned. One wonders if there could
possibly be a more compelling case for enforcement of the fourth
amendment than the facts of Moore; yet, the fourth amendment
did not prevail.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Garcs 3  indicates
that the Justices believe enough protections exist in cases in-
volving anticipatory search warrants to ensure a guarantee of
fourth amendment rights. Unfortunately, even the Garca opinion
cannot guarantee fourth amendment protections in the face of
the Court's history of deference to police flexibility and hostility
to the exclusion of incriminating evidence. If the Court wants to
establish real, as opposed to illusory, fourth amendment protec-
tions, the Court must issue an opinion that sets that philosophy
in stone. Otherwise, lower courts, no matter how well meaning,
will continue to roll back fourth amendment protections.
CONCLUSION
The tension between effective law enforcement and respect for
the right of privacy is at the heart of the anticipatory search
warrant dilemma:
[Ulnderlying the restraint on unreasonable searches is a fun-
damental attribute of freedom-an identifying characteristic of
the free society-a respect for privacy
It is in this as much as in any other single characteristic
that the free society differs from the totalitarian state. Privacy
is incompatible with totalitarianism because it is likely to
cover-indeed to propagate- non-conformity In the privacy of
their homes, men and women do many things, no doubt, of
which their neighbors, if they but knew, would disapprove.
Some of what they do may be immoral and impious and even
wicked-or might be thought so by the censorious. But it is
best for society to permit a wide degree of latitude to the
conduct of its individual members when that conduct has no
impact upon their fellow men. Tolerance is an indispensable
condition of freedom.3 24
Individuals like Patrick Henry and James Otis made a conscious
choice when they helped craft the language of the fourth amend-
ment:
323. 110 S. Ct. 348 (1989).
324. A. BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY 75 (1972).
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It was basically because they foresaw and did not relish the
possibility of [a totalitarian] world that the Englishmen and
Americans of the eighteenth century chose the risks
inherent in limited law enforcement. They did not choose to
exalt order over liberty or public safety over private rights.
Privacy, they understood, was an indispensable condition for
the growth of initiative and individuality and diversity-in
short, for the realization of man's potentialities and the flow-
ering of the human spirit. These were worth the payment of
a price in police efficiency325
These early judgments of the Framers of the fourth amendment
have been lost on a majority of the Supreme Court in recent
years.
As for the problems inherent in anticipatory search warrants,
the Court would be wise to adhere to its own historical philoso-
phy, best illustrated in Johnson v. United States.3 26 Justice Jackson
stated the following:
Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is [a]
grave concern to society The right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is also a grave concern When
the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by
a policeman or government enforcement agent.3
Given the growing concern over drug trafficking, child abuse,
and pornography in our society and the recent backsliding in
fourth amendment protections, the Court should limit the use
and scope of anticipatory search warrants to certain well-defined
situations. Although these search warrants are not unconstitu-
tional per se, the Court should establish for magistrates the
supporting evidence and conditions of execution that will keep
anticipatory search warrants within strict boundaries. In this
manner, the Court can and must alleviate any confusion among
magistrates issuing these warrants.
The vital privacy interests that the fourth amendment protects
demand that the Court strictly limit anticipatory search warrants
and alleviate any confusion for the magistrates who issue them.
325. Id. at 76.
326. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
327. Id. at 14.
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In doing so, the Court can only help to protect the rights of all
citizens. Patrick Henry would demand no less.
Michael J Flannery
